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1. rntmduction 
In an exchange conomy with I commodities an economic agent a is described 
by his preference relation So and his initial endowment vector e, E R: . 
Let B denote the set of all irreflexive and continuous binary relations on 
R: with the following property: for every price vector p % 0 the set cp(>, e, p) 
of maximal elements for > in the budget-set (x E R: 1 px <pe) is non-empty. 
For example, an irreflexive and continuous relation > belongs to B if it is 
transitive or convex (i.e., the set (x E R$ 1 x > z} is convex for every z E R:). 
In the latter case, a fixed point argument is used to establish the existence of 
maximal elements [Sonnenschein (1971) and Mas-Cole11 (1974)]. We endow 
the set B of preferences with Hausdorff’s topology of closed convergence; 
then B becomes a separable metric space and the demand-correspondence q is 
upper hemi-continuous at every point (>, e, p) E 9 x Rr+ x R: where p 9 0. 
[For details and concepts not explicitly defined, see e.g. Hildenbrand (1974)]. 
An exchange economy 6“ is defined by a finite set A of economic agents and 
an assignment o every agent a E A of a preference relation >. E 9 and an 
endowment vector e, E R’+ . Hence an exchange conomy is a mapping 
b:A-d%R’+. 
The distribution p8 of agents’ characteristics of the economy & is a measure 
on 9 x R’+ defined by 
/LAB) = 
#B-l(B) 
#A ’ 
for every Bore1 subset B of B x R$ . 
The mapping d we call the individualistic (microscopic) description of an 
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economy. The preference-endowment distribution ,u~ might be called the statis- 
tical (macroscopic) description of an economy. We will see later that for 
economies with a ‘large’ set A of agents the preference-endowment distribution 
,u8 is the appropriate concept. 
The outcome of any exchange process in the economy 6’ is an allocation, 
i.e., a functionf: A + R’+ such that 
Which allocations are likely to be observed as outcomes of the exchange 
process? We shall now define two a priori quite different concepts of economic 
equilibrium. 
(a) A Walrus allocation for the economy d is an allocation f which can be 
‘decentralized’ by a suitably chosen price system, i.e., there exists a price vector 
p* E R’, p* # 0, such that 
f, E W-,, e,,p*), a e A. 
The set of all Walras allocations for the economy 8 is denoted by W(8). 
(b) A coalition S of agents in A can improve upon a proposed allocation f 
for the economy d if there exists an allocation g such that 
(9 
(ii) 
g, >. f, for every a E S, 
aJl$? = &?a. 
The set of all allocations of the economy d that no coalition can improve 
upon is called the core of d and is denoted by C(d). 
It follows trivially from the definition that 
W(8) c cy>. 
However, in general, the core is much larger than the set W(b). 
Since Edgeworth (1881) economists have argued that the difference between 
these two equilibrium concepts is small for an economy in which every individual 
agent has a negligible influence on collective actions. The following two basic 
results give a precise meaning to the above proposition in quite different 
settings. Both results relate the core to the set of Walras equilibria for ‘large 
competitive economies’. 
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Denote by 6’” the ‘n-fold replica economy’ of a given economy 8, i.e., 
b,:A,-,BxR’+suchthat #A,=n.#Aandp,,,=~~(n= 1,2,...). 
Let us measure the difference between C(8) and W(b) by the smallest number 
6 > 0 for which the following holds: for every f E C(8) there exists f * E W(8) 
such that 
If(a)-f *(a)\ < 6 for every a E A. 
Call this number 6(C(b), W(b)). 
Since W(8) c C(b), 6(C(b), W(8)) is the Hausdorff distance between the 
two sets C(8) and W(d) where the distance between two allocations f and g is 
given by 
v;; If(a) -g(a)] - 
Theorem [Debreu-Scarf (1963)]. Let d be an economy with monotonic and 
strongly convex preferences and strictly positive total endowments. 
If (8.) is the sequence of replica economies of I, then 
&C(b”), WV”)) + 0. 
Aumann’s equivalence theorem 
In the definition of an economy one can substitute the finite set A of agents 
by any positive measure space (A, .zZ, v) with v(A) = 1. Then an economy with 
a measure space of economic agents is a measurable mapping d of (A, JZ’, v) 
into 9’ x Rf+ such that the mean endowment vector se dv is finite. An allocation 
is now an integrable function of (A, .J$, v) into R: with Jf dv = je dv. A 
coalition S is a measurable subset of A with v(S) > 0. The two equilibrium 
concepts W(J) and C(b) are extended in an obvious way. Let 8,, denote the 
set of monotonic preferences in 9. 
Theorem [Aumann (1964)]. Let d : (A, -Pe, v) + Pm0 x R: be an economy 
with an atomless measure space of economic agents and strictly positive mean 
endowments se dv. Then 
W(b) = C(b). 
The purpose of this survey is to relate these two fundamental results. For 
this purpose we introduce the concept of a ‘purely competitive sequence’ (&II) 
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of economies, which generalizes replica sequences, and we shall associate to 
every such sequence a ‘limit economy’ which may be represented as an economy 
with an atomless measure space of economic agents. 
DeJinition. The sequence (b,), 8, : A, -+ 9’ x R'+ , is called purely competitive 
if 
(0 
(ii) 
the number #A,, of agents in the economy tends to infinity, 
the sequence (p8,) of preference-endowment distributions converges 
weakly to a limit p, 
(iii) 
[For a detailed discussion of these sequences, ee Hildenbrand (1974, ch. 2.1).] 
It seems natural to consider as a ‘limit economy I,’ of a purely competitive 
sequence (8.) any economy with an atomless measure space of agents; the 
only condition would be that the preference-endowment distribution pLr; of 
this limit economy is equal to lim p8,. If one takes this view, that is to say, the 
measure space (A, JY, v) of agents has no intrinsic significance, then one has 
to show that two different atomless economies with the same distribution have 
the same set of equilibria. Since allocations are defined as functions on the 
space of agents one can not compare directly the allocations for different 
spaces of agents. We therefore consider their distributions on the commodity 
space R', i.e., 
@f)(B) = vcf- l(B)), B E .%'(R'). 
It is known [Kannai (1970)] that for two atomless economies d and 8’ with 
the same preference-endowment distribution the sets gIV(6’) and 9 W(C) of 
distributions of Walras equilibria are not necessarily identical. However the 
difference of gIV(L?) and gIV(8’) is not substantial; the two sets have the same 
closure. [For details see Hart-Hildenbrand-Kohlberg (1974).] 
The arbitrariness in the choice of the atomless measure space of agents for 
the limit economy strongly suggests that one should define the equilibria for 
the limit economy only in terms of the limit preference-endowment distribution 
lim p8,. In the limit the individual agent has so to speak lost his identity and 
it therefore seems artificial to keep the individualistic description of an economy 
in the limit. 
In section 2 we define an equilibrium distribution for an arbitrary preference- 
endowment distribution ,u. This concept is then used in section 3 to state a 
general imit theorem on the core. 
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2. Equilibrium distributions 
In this section we describe an economy only by a distribution p of agents’ 
characteristics, without referring to the individual agents. In this context an 
allocation is described by the joint distribution of agents’ characteristics (>, e) 
and consumption vectors X, that is by a measure z on the product B x R$ x R: . 
Definition. An equilibrium distribution for the distribution p of agents’ 
characteristics is a measure z on S x R’+ x R’+ with the properties: 
(0 the marginal distribution of z on the characteristic space T = B x R: 
is equal to the given measure p, i.e., ,LL = z 0 proj; I, 
where proj,(>, e, X) = (>, e); 
(ii) 
(iii) 
mean supply equals mean demand, i.e. fproj, dz = Jproj, dz, 
where proj,(>, e, x) = e and proj,( >, e, x) = x; 
there exists a price vector p E R’, p # 0, such that 
z{(>,e,x)E9’xR:xR$ fxE&-,e,p)) = 1. 
The set of all equilibrium distributions for ,u is denoted by W&B). 
Clearly the definition of an equilibrium distribution z is simply a reformula- 
tion of the usual concept of Walras equilibrium in terms of distributions. 
Indeed, if d : A --t 9 x R’+ is any economy with characteristic distribution pr 
and if f E W(8), then the distribution of the mapping (&,f) is an equilibrium 
distribution for p8. However, if z is an equilibrium distribution for the charac- 
teristic distribution ,u8 there is not necessarily a Walras allocationffor the eco- 
nomy d such that the distribution of (8, f) is equal to 7. The reason for this 
is that the space A of agents may be too small (even if it is atomless). One can 
assert only that for every -c E W,(p) there exists a suitably chosen economy 8 
with characteristic distribution p and an f E W(B) such that z is the distribution 
of (&,f>. 
Theorem 1. For every distribution p of agents’ characteristics in P,,,, x R$ 
with mean endowments jproj, d,u strictly positive there exists an equilibrium 
distribution z. The correspondence 
has the following continuity property: 
Let the sequence (~3 be weakly convergent to p on P,,,, x R: , where 
lim jproj, dp,, = Jproj, dp p 0. 
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Then for every sequence (z”), t, E W&J, there exists a weakly convergent sub- 
sequence whose limit belongs to W,(p). 
If one restricts all characteristic distributions to a compact subset T of 
g,,.,,xR: then Theorem 1 means that the correspondence p t-, W,(p) is 
compact-valued and u.h.c. at every characteristic distribution p on T with 
strictly positive mean endowments. 
We sketch now a proof for the compact case. The general situation is easily 
reduced to the compact case by using the tightness of the measures on 8,., x R'+ . 
[For details, see Hildenbrand (1974, Theorem 3, p. 159).] 
The existence of equilibrium distributions r will follow easily if we have 
established the u.h.c. of ,U H W,(p). Let z, E W&J, (n = 1, . . .). We shall 
first show that the sequence (7,) is relative compact, so that there exists a 
converging subsequence, and then we shall prove that the limit of this sub- 
sequence belongs to W,(p). 
Let pn be a normalized price vector corresponding to the equilibrium distribu- 
tion 7,. Since preferences are monotonic we must have pn % 0. It follows that 
every limit point p of the sequence is strictly positive. Indeed, assume to the 
contrary that p,, + p, where p is not strictly positive. It is well-known (and 
easily shown) that the sequence of individual demand sets (cp(t,p,)) is unbounded, 
i.e., for every bounded set B c R’ we have cp(t,p,) n B = $9 for n large 
enough. By continuity it then follows that the same conclusion holds uniformly 
for all t in the compact set T c P,,,, x R’. Thus, ‘F,(T x B) = 0 for every bounded 
set B c R: and n large enough. But this implies that the mean demand vector 
jproj, dz, will be larger than the mean supply Jproj, dp” ; a contradiction. 
Therefore there is a compact subset K c R$ such that q(t,pJ c Kfor every 
n= l,... and t E T. Consequently, every measure z, is concentrated on the 
compact set TX K which proves the relative compactness of the sequence (7,). 
Let z, + r and pn --f p. It remains to show that z E W,(p). Properties (i) 
and (ii) are easily verified. In order to prove property (iii), consider the cor- 
respondence 
pbEp: = ((t, x) E TX R1 1 x E co@, PI>. 
The correspondence is compact-valued and u.h.c. at every p B 0. Thus EPn is 
contained in a closed neighborhood U of EP for n large enough. Since z,(EP,) = 1, 
we have r,(U) = 1. Consequently, z(U) 2 lim sup z,(U) = 1. It then follows 
that z(E,) = 1. 
In order to prove that W,(p) # 0 it suffices to consider characteristic 
distributions p withJinite support since the set of these measures is dense and 
since we established the above continuity property of W,( .). 
Let supp 01) = (tl , t2, . . ., t,.} and define 
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[Note that even for convex (but not complete) preferences the demand set 
cp(t, p) is not necessarily convex. ]
To prove the existence of an equilibrium distribution p with an equilibrium 
price vector p it suffices to find a vector p* # 0 such that 0 E Z(p*). But such 
a price vector p* can be obtained by the well-known fixed point argument 
[Debreu (1959)]. The measure z is then obtained in the following way: 
where 
Thus, 
Zi E CO q(ti,P*)-ei. 
Zi+f!i = i I:$, 
k=O 
where 
Xf E p(ti,p*), 1; > 0. 
k=O 
Define now 
and 
SUPP (7) = {(tip x:) 1 i = 1, . . ., r, k = 0, . . ., I}, 
7(4, x9 = ~(ti)'n:. 
3. Limit theorems on the core 
Let (8.) be a purely competitive sequence of economies with characteristics 
in pm0 x R: as defined in the introduction. Let W&u) denote the set of equili- 
brium distributions for the preference-endowment distribution p = lim ,Q,. If 
f E C(8), we denote by S%$,f) the distribution of the mapping a I-+ (~Y(a),f(a)), 
i.e., 
and let C,(b) = (~(&,jJ IKE C(8)). The set of measures on g)mo x R$ x R$ is 
endowed with the weak topology. 
Theorem 2. Let (S,) be a purely competitive sequence sf economies with 
characteristics in B,, x R’+ and let U be a- neighborhbod of w,(p). 
large enough 
GiMN) c u* 
The proof is too lengthy to be given here. The interested reader is 
Hildenbrand (1974, Proposition 3, p. 200). 
Then for n 
referred to 
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We now want to compare the assertion of Theorem 2 with the much stronger 
conclusion in Debreu-Scarf’s theorem as stated in the introduction. 
(a) Let us first remark that a statement in terms of distributions necessarily 
is a statement about most agents of the economy and not about every agent. 
This becomes clear if we give an equivalent formulation of Theorem 2 in terms 
of allocations as functions rather than in terms of their distributions. To avoid 
technical complications we restrict ourselves now to strongly convex preferences 
in order to obtain a unique maximal element q(>, e, p) [for a detailed discussion 
of the general case, see Hildenbrand (1974, ch. 3.3)]. 
Let %,,,,, denote the subset of monotonic and strongly convex preferences 
in 8. 
Theorem 3. Let (8”) be a purely competitive sequence on 8,,,S,, x R: . Then 
for every E > 0 and q > 0 there exists an ii such thatfor every n 2 E andf E C(&,) 
there exists p E n(p) with the properties: 
We emphasize that the price vector p E n(p), which approximately decentralizes 
the core allocationf, for most agents is an equilibrium price vector for the limit 
characteristic distribution p = lim pLr,. 
In order to show that Theorem 2 implies Theorem 3 we remark that it 
suffices to show that for every sequence (fJ, f,, E C(&‘,), there is a subsequence 
(f.,) and a price vector p E L’(p) such that the sequence 
converges in measure to zero. Let f, E: C(b,). By Theorem 2 we can assume that 
a subsequence (6’“.,, f ,) converges in distribution to an equilibrium distribution 
z E W,(p). One now chooses a continuous representation of (&‘“.,, f ,,) [see 
Hildenbrand (1974, Proposition 2, p. 139)] and then one applies the arguments 
of part (c) of the proof of Theorem 1 in Hildenbrand (1974, p. 189). 
On the other hand one easily shows that Theorem 3 implies Theorem 2 in 
the case of strongly convex preferences. 
Indeed, it suffices to show that for every sequence (f,), f. E C(d,), there is a 
subsequence (n,) such that 
Theorem 3 implies that for every sequence cf.), fn E C(&‘J, there is a subsequence 
(n,) and a price vector p E 17(p) such that 
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converges in measure to zero. Therefore, if (Bn4, (p(&“*( .), p)) converges in 
distribution to a measure, say r, then (&‘nq,fnq) also converges to the same 
measure [e.g., Billingsley (1968, Theorem 4.1, p. 25)]. But (Sng, (P(&~~(.),P)), 
where p E n(p), converges in distribution to the equilibrium distribution 
z E W,(p) which corresponds to the equilibrium price p. 
(b) In Debreu-Scarf’s limit theorem one compares the core C(b,) with the 
set W(&,) of Walras allocations of the same economy while in Theorem 2 we 
compare the core of b, - more precisely the set C,(Q,) of measures - with the 
set W,(p) of equilibrium distributions of the limit characteristic distribution 
p = lim pI,. [Of course, for replica sequences there is no difference, since 
~$&I) = WdPL)!l 
If we endow the space of measures on B x R' x R' with the Prohorov metric, 
then we can introduce the Hausdorff distance 6 for subsets of measures. 
Debreu-Scarf’s limit theorem then implies that 
In Theorem 2 we assert only that the Hausdorff semi-distance 
sup dist (r, W&J)) 
dfa8, 
converges to zero. The reason for the stronger conclusion to be true is again 
the continuity of the set W,( 0) when ptn + p. Indeed, one easily shows: 
Let (8,) be a purely competitive sequence on 8, x R'+ such that 
Then 
6) ~(U~“), w&4 + 0, 
(ii) &CA&,), W,(A)) + 0. 
We emphasize that the continuity of W,( .) is essential. Without it, one can 
easily construct examples uch that (i) or (ii) does not hold. Therefore, in order 
to obtain stronger conclusions than in Theorem 2 or 3 either one has to restrict 
the analysis to special sequences - e.g., the replica sequences - or one has to 
specify those characteristic distributions p for which the correspondence 
p H W,(p) is continuous. 
The latter approach has been taken by H. Dierker in a paper appearing in 
this issue. 
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Once one has the stronger conclusion 
one can ask a much stronger question: how fast is this convergence? For 
replica economies the answer has recently been given by Debreu (1975): for a 
regular economy 8 the distance between the core of ~3’~ and its set of Walras 
allocations converges to zero at least as fast as the inverse of the number of 
agents. The same speed of convergence for the general case of purely competitive 
sequences with regular limit distribution p was shown by B. Grodal, whose 
paper is also presented in this issue. 
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